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JURY TRIAL, WAIVER THEREOF AND THE
ALTERNATE JUROR*
I.

SHALL TIM JURY SYSTEM BE ABOLiSHED?

The day bas come when no institution, no matter how traditional, honored, venerable or even worthwhile, is beyond the
pale of criticism. Of recent and fervent character has been an
avalanche of censure towards the jury as a part of our legal
system.
"The day Is upon us when tradition bows
and no mere reverence for historical usage may
vation of accredited merit. But It is meet that
ing such a fundamental institution as trial by
liberately." 1

to practical efficiency
long impede an innoradical reform affectjury should move de-

The criticism made of the jury has been in complaints that
in a great majority of cases, whether caused by qualifications of
jurors being too low and the essential obtuseness of uneducated
minds, or the capricious and wayward humors whieh sway them,
the result is little less than a lottery and even indirect bribery is
frequently suspected to operate in some of the cases, especially
in those which unscrupulous attorneys conduct.
Upon trial of such an institution, however, "its history must
'2
be allowed; the lamp of experience must not be dimmed."
Jury trial has been defined as a mode of trial by which a
few citizens selected for the purpose are constituted the judges
of the truth, of the facts in suits between parties and compelled
to discharge this duty on the sanctity of their oaths, but in subordination to a higher judge, who has distinct functions of control. Various theories have been adopted as to the origin and
development of this characteristic feature of the administration
of justice through the jury trial. Jury trial does not owe its
existence to any positive statute but has grown up insensibly and
has become inextricably interwoven with the people's habits. It
was generally supposed, until recently, that our Anglo-Saxon
ancestors had the credit of having nursed the germ of this vigor*This is one of a series of notes on "Waiver of Jury Trial In Criminal Cases."
Amer. Bar Assoc. Jour., Oct. 192--Jury on Trial-H. H. Corbin.
Supra 1.
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ous plant of liberty, and most papers concerning its origin
embody this popular belief. Recent researches have, however,
shown that jury trial,3 as now known and practiced, did not
exist in those times though it has been the natural development
and sequence of other rudimentary forms of trial then prevailing.
However, the jury trial was an institution prominent in the
Anglo-Saxon resistence to oppression. The principle that a freeman cannot be deprived of liberty or property except by the lawful judgment of his equals was stated by Magna Charter in 1215.
The purpose of the jury was to resist oppression of king or
state. The force of query therefore is, has the state become so
perfect as to cease to threaten the rights and liberties of the
individual ?
Mr. Corbin 4 says, concerning the jury trial in criminal cases,
"it has stood and always will stand as the only bulwark between the security of the individual and the oppressive use of
power by the state."
Judge Gregory in his Kentucky Criminal Law, cites the quotation, "that the common judgment of twelve men of the average
of the community, with their varied experiences, is more to be
trusted on such questions of fact than the conclusions of a single
judge, however learned."5
It is submitted that the raison d'etre of jury trial is found
in human nature itself and that it in some phase or other, has
been detected in almost every form of civilization, its essence
being a reference of disputed facts to the impartial judgment of
a few men of average understanding and of nearly the same
stage of life as the litigant or the defendant, as the case may be.
Further, that one great advantage of the jury trial over and
above the essential fairness of the principle on which it is
founded, is the experience and knowledge as well as the love of
fair play, which are thereby acquired by the people who take
part in it. And further, that the chief reason why the jury
trial has so long stood and still stands so high in public favor
is that not withstanding all its glaring and familiar defects, no
'See Forsyth, History of Jury Trial, cited Universal Knowledge,
Volume VIII, p. 551.
Supra 1.
C. & 0. By. Go. v. Davis, 119 Ky. 641, 60 S. W. 14 (1900) (Gregory
Ky. Crim. Law Sec. 1033).
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other machinery has ever been devised which is not open to similar or greater criticism.
It is finally submitted that the jury has a permanent and
necessary function and place in our system of justice and for
the reasons given should not be abolished.
However, it is admitted that our system of justice is not
without its defects, chief among which are the cost, delay, and
trouble in furnishing a jury for every trial,6 and the real purpose
of this paper is to discuss a problem arising from such defects,
i. e., may one have the right to waive a trial by jury and be tried
by the court alone if he so desires ? This problem is not easy of
solution. The primary difficulty is in its constitutionality.
I.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WAIVER OF JURY.

A constitution is supposed to embody the fundamental,
organic law or principles of government of a society, nation or
state. In this country it was conceived not only with the purpose of becoming the embodiment of the principles of the
organic structure of our government, but also -with the fervent
and predominent design of preserving to the people certain
safeguards against oppression and guarantees of sacred rights
and liberties. The constitutions of the States have in the main
been propagated with the same purposes and generally modeled
after our Federal document.
Since the constitutions have been written with the view
of maintaining rights against the possible oppression of the
state, it was only natural that the jury trial, the purpose of
which was to protect the individual against the king or state,
according to Blackstone, 7 would receive the attention of the
framers.
Such was the subject matter of our Federal Constitution in
Article 3, section 2, clause 3, and also in the sixth Amendment."
The State Constitutions have all "followed suit" with like stipulations. The provisions in the various state constitutions generally follow similar phraseology, i. e., "the right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate" or "shall remain," some adding
6 See the fable of the watch that stopped, Vol. 12, No. 2, p. 53,
Journal of American Judicature Society-Wigmore.
' Blackstone's Com. Book IV, p. 349.
2These will be discussed at more length, infra.
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the phrase "heretofore" or "as heretofore enjoyed." It is belevied with frankness that the majority of constitutions can
be said to have no more expressive or mandatory provisions than
those indicated and that all are equivalent to a similar interpretation. It is submitted that this proposition will not be controverted.
Lord Coke has said that common law is common sense. This
saying, while perhaps lacking much truth, is fortified with a
great deal of merit. In the light of such reasoning and the facts
heretofore given, the proposition is, what interpretation should
be placed upon the constitutional provisions concerning jury
trial and the possibility of waiver thereof ?
With few exceptions most of the state constitutions are
silent as to waiver. As to whether there is a constitutional
power to provide for trials without jury becomes a matter of
construction in most cases.
Let us consider therefore, the various interpretations placed
on the matter by the courts of our land.
In the case of State v. Baer9 the question was raised directly
as to whether the right of trial by jury as guaranteed by Sections
5 and 10 of the State Bill of Rights could be waived. The provisions in the State Bill of Rights were typical: "The right of
trial by jury shall remain inviolate; in any trial in any court, the
party accused shall be allowed . . . a speedy public trial by
.
an impartial jury
The court answered the question in the affirmative, denying
the appellant's objection to his voluntary waiver of a part of
his jury.
0
The case of State v. Worden' held, in declaring a statute
authorizing waiver constitutional, that "the natural and obvious
meaning (of the constitutional provision) is to secure to suitors
and persons accused of crime, as individuals, the right and
privilege of having their causes heard and determined by a jury;
and it is difficult to see how the principles of liberty and self
government, or the interest of the body politic can in any way
be put in jeopardy by a waiver of that right." And further,
that while the legislature could not abridge the right of jury
trial, it could improve it, and "adapt it from time to time to the
9 103 Ohio St. 585, 134 N. E. 786 (1921).
"*46 Conn. 349 (1878).
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ever changing phases of human affairs." The provision in the
Connecticut Bill of Rights is, "the right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate."
Ten years later an Indiana statute similar to that of Connecticut, except that capital offenses were expressly excluded,
was declared constitutional in Murphy v. State."
In the case of State v. Woodling,12 it was held that trial by
jury was for the protection of the defendant and might be waived
in trials for minor offenses. Two cases in Kentucky, 3 Murphy
v. Comnioniealth,14 and Phipps v. Commonwealth,15 resulted in
similar holdings under a statute authorizing less than twelve in
a trial for a misdemeanor.
In nearly every case concerning waiver of jury, the question involved has not been an interpretation of the constitutional
provision but rath.er of statutory enactments construed as making jury trial mandatory. The decision that would be rendered
in a majority of our state courts if the constitutiofal provision
was the sole criterion of whether one could voluntarily waive
his right to a jury or not, would be hard to guess. There has
generally been legislation of some kind, either authorizing or
forbidding a waiver.
In Harris v. People,"6 there was no legislation and the court
-aid that "while a defendant may waive his right to jury trial,
h. cannot by such waiver confr jurisdiction to try him upon
a tribunal which has no such jurisdiction by law." This case
maintains the view that the jury goes to the jurisdiction of the
court, which is based on the reasoning that consent cannot confer
jurisdiction. This view, while not wholly sound if the jury trial
is considered as a privilege as we have tried to reason it should
be, as the support of Cooley and others, and might be considered
fairly reasonable. The obvious remedy is to provide legislation
authorizing waiver in all cases.
Many of our states have statutes authorizing waiver in misdemeanor cases but not in felony cases. The reason for such a
distinction is not clear. Six states have legislation authorizing
"97 Ind. 579, (1884) 15 Minn. Law Review.
"63 Minn. 142, 54 N. W. 1068 (1893).
13Will be discussed more fully infra.
"1 Metcalf (Ky.) 365 (1858).
205 Ky. 832, 266 S. W. 651 (1924).
20128 Ill. 585, 21 N. E. 563 (1889).
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waiver of jury in both cases. 1 7 Some of these, however, do not
permit waiver in capital offense cases. This perhaps is a valid
exception, as so mue, more is at stake and so much responsibility
should not be placed upon one man, even at the request of the
one in jeopardy.
However, in such a case, the defendant may plead guilty
and in most jurisdictions under such a plea, the court would fix
the penalty. This raises the still further entertaining and complicated question concerning this matter as to whether a plea of
guilty is equivalent to a waiver of jury. There are adherents to
both views on this proposition.' 8
For those who answer in the negative it is said that the jury
is a fact finding body, that under a plea of guilty the facts are
admitted and therefore no trial is necessary and there is no
waiver.
On the other hand, Oppenheim 19 who represents the affirmative, says "there seems to be no escape from the logic of the
conclusion that a plea of guilty is a relinquishment of the right
to a jury trial. Indeed it waives not only the jury but the other
constitutional guarantees which are incidents of the criminal
trial. "
In reply to the argument of those upholding the negative
of the proposition, who say there is not trial on a plea of guilty,
it is urged that the waiver of the trial altogether, which constitutes the whole, necessarily includes waiver of jury, a constituent part. A plea of guilty allowed seems also to refute the contention that jury trial is guaranteed because of the public interest involved. Under such reasoning, one should never be permitted to jeopardize his safety by submitting to a verdict by the
court.
"If the public have an interest in the liberties of the individual
to the extent of making a jury trial mandatory, is that interest less
important when the accused elects to avoid any trial?" 2

It is submitted by the writer that the court's duty on a plea
of guilty is not entirely different from a jury's duty under a
plea of not guilty. 'While the facts as they exist in bareness are
"Conn., Ind., Md., N. J., Wash., Wise.
" Oppenheim, yes; Perkins, no; 25 Mich. Law Rev. 695, 16 Iowa
Law Rev. 20.
1, See 18, supra.
See note 19, supra.
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admitted under a guilty plea, yet the function of a criminal
jury and also of the court in rendering a verdict determining a
penalty, lies not entirely in the determination of what facts
exist, but in the interpretation of the facts given. A court does
not merely say when the defendant pleads guilty, that the facts
herein admitted constitute X situation which calls for B penalty,
from which there can be no deviation. The court interprets the
facts as to the circumstances from which they arise and as to
the nature, motive, and mentality of the defendant with regard
to the seriousness of cause and consequence before meting out a
penalty. There have been many cases in which one accused of
a crime has, when completely aware of the facts, which perhaps
were highly persuasive of his guilt even though he might be innocent, preferred to place an interpretation of those facts before
the court under a plea of guilty, relying on a keener understanding than found in any jury. This reasoning, it is believed, indicates that a plea of guilty is closely related to, if not actually, a
waiver of jury.
In support of the view that a mandatory constitutional provision providing for a trial by jury is merely mandatory in that
it provides for a right of which the defendant cannot be deprived, is urged a comparison of similar mandatory provisions
concerning other equally vital rights of the accused. For example, the right to a trial in the county in which the offense was
committed, the right to a speedy trial, the right to unprejudiced
jurors, the right to an exclusion of improper testimony, the right
to be confronted by the witnesses against him, and the right to
be represented by counsel. All these rights, guaranteed in most
constitutions in just as strong language as jury trial, have been
held subject to waiver in one way or another as by change oB
venue, continuance, failure to challenge, allowing admission of
improper testimony, use of deposition and affidavit, and refusal
of counsel. It appears that the amount of public policy and interest therein involved does not vary greatly.
Another interesting complication is the problem arising as
to whether waiver of a part of the jury constitutes a waiver of
the whole as far as the constitutionality is concerned. While
some courts have reasoned that the problem is not the same, the
more logical and better reasoned argument sustains the proposition that the same question is involved. This appears to be
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beyond doubt, for there can be no such valid dividing line drawn
as to the number of jurors which might be waived without doing
violence to principles of reason.
A case of vital importance on the problem of waiver of jury,
of recent decision and worthy of special comment, is Patton v.
United States,2 1 decided by the Supreme Court.
The Constitution of the United States provides in Article 3,
section 2, clause 3: "The trial of all crimes except in cases of
impeachment shall be tried by jury and such trial shall be held
in the state where the said crime shall have been committed,"
etc.
The Sixth Amendment says: "In all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime
shall b.ave been committed," etc.
Until the Patton case the general opinion was that a waiver
of trial by jury would not be held constitutional under our
There was strong and persuasive
Federal Constitution.
language leading to this belief in Thompson v. Utah,2 2 and other
federal cases. Certainly the language of our federal document
is mandatory.
The facts in the Patton case were, briefly, that the accused
was tried for bribing an official and during the course of the
trial a juror became ill, whereby the defendant agreed to the
remainder of the case being submitted to the eleven remaining
jurors. The case was appealed after conviction of the defendant
on the ground that he did not have the constitutional right to
waive a jury trial.
The court held in refuting this contention (1) that the
guarantee of trial by jury was a privilege of the defendant; (2)
that waiver of one juror constituted and involved the same problem as waiver of the entire body and submission to the court;
(3) that the constitutional provision was not jurisdictional but
was meant to confer a right upon the accused which he might
forego at his election and that to deny his power to do so is to
convert a privilege into an imperative requirement, and (4)
that the consent of the court and prosecuting attorney must be
" 281 U. S. 276 (1929).
"170 U. S. 343 (1897).
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had in addition to the defendant's consent before a waiver should
be permitted.
It is to be observed that the holding of this case plainly
states that the right to trial by jury may be waived and that
there should be no distinction between misdemeanors and felonies. But the case adds the proviso that the consent of the court
and prosecuting attorney must be had in addition to the consent
of the defendant when waiver is desired.
The case stipulates that waiver by the accused must not be
put into effect at all events but the trial court must exercise discretion to avoid unreasonable departures with caution increasing
with the gravity of the offense.
It is submitted that this limitation placed on the right constitutes an inconsistency in the reasoning of the case. The court
goes at great length to enunciate that the right to jury trial was
mandatory in form only and that its real purpose was to perpetrate the sacred privilege for the benefit of accused.
Then to require consent of both court and prosecuting attorney is strongly indicative of the public interest theory and
could by virtue of its practice become transformed whenever desired into a practical nullification of the rule with a resulting
destruction of the accused's privilege. This exception in the
case certainly weakens its worth; nevertheless, the case by virtue of announcing the privilege theory as the test of the supreme
court, has been of great encouragement to the upholders of constitutional waiver.
In summarizing we find:
(1) That the right to a jury trial is a privilege of the
accused.
(2) That constitutional provisions in general are mandatory only as to the preservation of that privilege.
(3) That waiver has been denied in most cases, not because
of the constitutional provision, -but because of statutes construed as making jury trial mandatory.
(4) That waiver of part of jury or of entire jury has been
upheld in absence of statutory sanction in misdemeanor.
(5) That no distinction should be made between misdemeanors and felonies.
(6) That a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver.

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

(7) That, in general, consistent with the prevailing constitutional limitations relating to trial by jury, and in the absence
of legislation to the contrary, the accused should have the power
in criminal prosecution to voluntarily submit his cause to the
court and thereby consent to a determination of guilt or iniocence without a jury.
(8) That it is more desirable to have legislation enacted in
addition to the constitutional provisions providing for waiver
in all cases, with the exception perhaps of capital offense cases.
(9) That waiver should be made in open court in writing
by the accused; but that the consent of court and prosecuting attorney should not be required.
III.

WAVR oF JuRy TRIAL LT KENTUCKY.

a.
b.

Present Situation.
Specific Recommendations.

a. The present situation concerning waiver of jury in Kentucky is clear. The reasons for it are also obvious. The constitutional provisions relating to the matter are not unlike those
of states permitting waiver.
Section 7 of the Bill of Rights provides: "The ancient
mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred and the right thereof
remain inviolate subject to such modification as may be authorized by this constitution."
Section 11 stipulates: "In all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the vicinage."
It seems that there is nothing in these two provisions which
would force a court to deny waiver in the absence of legislation.
A case on this precise point has not been decided in this state.
Instead the legislature of the state at one time made very evident its attitude as to how the problem should be handled by enacting statute 2252, which reads: "A petit jury in the circuit
court shall consist of twelve persons and in all trials held in
courts inferior to the circuit court or by any county, police, or
city judge or justice of the peace, a jury shall consist of six
persons; but the parties to any action or prosecution except for
felony may agree to a trial by a less number of persons than is
provided for in this section."
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It says what it means.
The interpretation is obvious.
Waiver is permissible in misdemeanor cases but not in felony
trials. However, the Kentucky courts in rendering their decision on this matter, while in the last analysis pinning the
result to Section 2252 of the statute, have given strong and persuasive dicta to the effect that in the absence of statute, the
constitutional provisions demand a jury of twelve men to try
23
every felony case.
In Phipps v. Commonwealth, 24 a misdemeanor case since
the statute, waiver was permitted.
In repetition, whatever the constitutional provision, the
statute is reliable for all decisions since its passage.
Historically, the present constitution is Kentucky's fourth.
It was adopted in 1891. The constitutional provisions for jury
trial are traceable to the constitution of 1850, Article 13, Section
8. Section 2252 of the statutes was enacted in 1893.
It is difficult to say what the court would hold in absence of
that statute, as dicta in several cases point strongly to a denial
of waiver.
In the case of Tyra v. Comnwnwealth,25 decided in 1859
under the 1850 constitution, after the jury were sworn and had
heard a portion of the testimony and adjourned until the next
morning, one of them failed to attend. Then by consent of the
attorney for the commonwealth and the prisoner they agreed
to proceed with the trial with the eleven remaining jurors, and
the court held such trial proper. The remarkable feature of the
case, however, is the fact that the offense was punishable both
as a felony and misdemeanor. The jury fixed the penalty as
for a misdemeanor, but the court pointedly said, "But, if as
contended, the record presents a ease of felony, and not of misdemeanor, it follows that according to section 334 of the Criminal Code, the error complained of is not such as to authorize the
.....
court to reverse the judgment of conviction.
of the belief
be
highly
persuasive
writer
to
This seems to the
13Jackson v. Conmnonwealth, 221 Ky. 823, 299 S. W. 983 (1927);
Rrazhant v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 734, 273 S. W. 489 (1925); Wendlitni v. Commonwealth, 143 Ky. 587, 137 S. W. 205 (1911); McLaughlin
v. Commonwealth, 192 Ky. 206, 232 S. W. 628 (1921).
2 205 Ky. 832, 266 S. W. 651 (1924).
-59 Ky. 1.

KENTUCKY LAiV JOURNAL

that in absence of statute forbidding waiver, it might be allowed
even in a felony case.
There is no doubt that as to misdemeanors in Kentucky, the
defendant has always had the right to waive his right to a jury
trial even in the absence of statutory enactment. 26 The present
situation, therefore, is that under statute 2252 (1) waiver of
jury may be had in any misdemeanor case but (2) in all felony
trials it is forbidden.
It is submitted that the cases in Kentucky decided adverse
to waiver are based on statutory grounds rather than on the
constitutional provisions themselves.
B. Specific Recommendations.
The obvious necessity in obtaining waiver in this state is
the repeal of statute 2252. The constitutional provision, i. e.,
Section 7 of the Bill of Rights, states that the right shall remain
inviolate subject to such modifications authorized by this constitution.
The most desirable thing would be an amendment to said
provision which would authorize waiver. The next desirable
feature would be to enact under our present provision, a statute
authorizing waiver. The least desirable but apparently reasonable construction is that in the absence of all legislation, the
constitutional provisions themselves should be interpreted so as
to permit waiver.
It is believed that either of these latter two methods is possible without a constitutional amendment and that some solution
should be reached immediately for the benefit of the citizenry
of the state in perpetrating the work of justice in a much more
satisfactory and quicker way.
It is contended by those who maintain that waiver of jury
trial in this state is unconstitutional in any light without a con27
plus the
stitutional amendment, that certain code sections
constitutional provision, 248 have an important bearing on the
issue. In refutation of the code section argument, it may be
said that our code does not consist of substantive law but only
of rules for the government of court machinery. As to provision 248 of the Constitution, the evident content relates to
the qualifications of jurors and tile grand jury. There is nothlaMurphy v. CommonweaZth, 55 Ky. 365 (1858).
27 Kentucky Criminal Code, Secs. 180, 181, 182.
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ing that would indicate wheth.er a trial by jury is mandatory
or not.
It is urged finally that Kentucky is among those states
whose constitutions are silent as to waiver but which have special legislation forbidding it, and that as this legislation (in
Kentucky) might have been indicative of the public policyat
the time it was enacted (1893), ih looks antiquated in the light
of present day conditions and should be abolished. Instead we
should have the addition of an amendment to our present constitution specifically authorizing the privilege of waiver.

IV. THE

ALTERNATE JUROR

The alternate or thirteenth juror is a new step towards the
alleviation of needless trials in criminal procedure. This need
for such a substitute occurs more often than one would suspect.
A mistrial in the Gastonia murder case at Charlotte, N. C.,
because one of the jurors, after the trial had proceeded many
days, became violently insane, illustrates the point. Several
states have adopted this creditable plan.
The same oath is administered to the alternate juror, where
the practice prevails, as to the regular members. The alternate
juror is to remain near the regular jury with equal facilities and
opportunity for observing and hearing the evidence and an
equal duty to obey the orders of the court. If the twelve regular jurymen survive without illness or mishap until the end of
a case, then the extra juryman is dismissed and only the twelve
deliberate.
The alternate juror plan has been attacked on constitutional
grounds but has survived the seige.
It is submitted that the plan is a valuable one and should
be adopted in all states to allow the court at its discretion to
provide for an alternate juror in a case which promises great
length and delay.
There is no provision for an alternate juror in Kentucky.
If, after a jury has been selected and the trial begun, a juror
becomes sick and unable to continue as a juror, the jury must
be discharged and the cause tried again. 28
The code of this state also provides that if an accepted juror
2KY. Crim. Code 252.

K. L. J.-10
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becomes too sick to continue with his duties, before the jury has
him and complete the
been completed, the court may excuse
29
jury as if he had not been accepted.
If sickness occur after the jury has retired for the purpose
of reaching a verdict, the jury may be discharged, or if the sickness be only temporary the court may allow the sick juror to be
segregated from the others and be placed in charge of an officer,
at the discretion of the court, the deliberations to be resumed on
recovery of the ailing member.80
These provisions are of only slight benefit and in no way
measure up to the need of procedure in perpetrating speedy
determination of the Court's work.
It is urged that as an additional recommendation, it would
be highly beneficial to the state to incorporate into the system
of trial by jury a plan whereby an alternate or substitute juror
would be present in those cases which promise to be of great
expense and delay, if there be a mistrial.
AiimD A. NA
Attorney-at-Law,
Lexington, KY.

Ky. Crim Code 250.
a' Ky. Crim. Code 251.

